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Introduction
The economic consequences of …xed production costs have been largely neglected in the literature, analyzing input market transactions. In the respective literature, input prices are typically determined at the margin, i.e., by the interaction of upstream …rms'supply functions and downstream …rms'derived demand functions. Even when bargaining between vertically related …rms is considered, contractual outcomes rely on the …rms'"marginal contribution" to the bilateral surpluses (Inderst and Sha¤er 2009 ). These approaches remain silent about how …xed production costs are shared across the vertically related …rms and how they a¤ect the terms of contracts and the market outcome. 1 The consideration of …xed production costs, however, has become increasingly relevant as public regulations have imposed considerable additional …xed costs on many manufacturing …rms. This is particularly true for the food industry, where food scares-such as the periodical outbreaks of foodborne illness caused by pathogens 2 -have fueled public concern about food safety. 3 As a consequence, public regulations have been tightened to ensure the quality of products and services. In addition, the number of ISO certi…cations (either publicly required or voluntarily implemented) in many industries has grown exponentially in recent years (see ISO 2012). Compliance with these standards induce signi…cant additional costs for producers, tracing back to the need for (supplementary) quality control technologies such as product inspection and testing, process controls and various audits. In particular, extra labor has to be employed 1 This may trace back to the fact that in many vertical structures, upstream …xed cost do not a¤ect market outcomes. Consider an upstream monopolist, which delivers to an oligopolistic retail sector, upstream …xed costs do not a¤ect the market outcome as long as pro…t sharing allows to cover the upstream …xed costs. The same holds for …xed costs borne by an oligopolistic upstream sector, which supplies a common retailer. ill people and in the death of more than 56 people (see EFSA Journal 2013, 11(1), 3025). 3 For example, to foster the integrated management of foodborne hazards from farm-to-fork, the U.S. enacted the mandated use of the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP). The HACCP system identi…es speci…c hazards and measures for their control to ensure the safety of food along the entire production process (for a detailed description, see the Codex Alimentarius of the FAO/WHO). In the European Union, the implementation of the HACCP system became mandatory for food industries in 1995 (EU Directive 93/43).
2 to manage the daily tasks of documentation (Bain and Busch 2004) . 4 Note that these additional production costs are only incurred if production actually takes place, without depending on the total quantity produced (Antle 2000) . In other words, producers bear substantial inframarginal or …xed operating costs when complying with the more and more demanding public or private (quality) standards.
We consider a vertical structure with perfectly competitive upstream …rms ("suppliers") that compete to deliver a homogenous good to a di¤erentiated downstream duopoly ("retailers"). 5 The upstream …rms make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to the retailers-either in the form of simple linear or two-part tari¤ contracts 6 -and incur a …xed cost if production actually takes place.
Within this framework, we show that …xed costs a¤ect both input market contracting and …nal goods prices. Most importantly, we …nd that …xed costs may help to monopolize an imperfectly competitive downstream market and, thus translate into higher consumer prices.
Our results depend on the nature of contracts. Perfect competition among upstream producers implies two equilibrium properties: …rst, any upstream producer makes zero pro…t and second, both retailers select a common supplier even though they are di¤erentiated. In the case of linear contracts, the equilibrium wholesale prices are increasing in the amount of the …xed cost, because the upstream …rm's margins need to cover that …xed cost. Under two-part tari¤ contracts, however, a su¢ ciently high …xed cost enables the retailers to monopolize the market.
As the retailers select a common supplier that internalizes all externalities, the industry pro…t is maximized. In contrast to the general presumption that two-part tari¤ contracts are more e¢ cient than linear contracts, 7 we …nd that two-part tari¤ contracts may well lead to higher consumer prices than linear contracts.
The identi…ed anticompetitive e¤ects of two-part tari¤ contracts are in line with the …ndings of Sha¤er (1991) . In a similar industry structure but without considering any …xed costs at the upstream level, he shows that the competing upstream …rms charge a wholesale price above marginal cost to soften downstream competition. The rents are redistributed to the retailers via negative …xed fees (slotting allowances). However, in Sha¤er (1991) the monopoly solution can never be sustained as an equilibrium outcome. We show instead that monopolization in fact becomes possible when considering …xed costs at the upstream level. Upstream …xed costs imply that the retailers necessarily buy from a common supplier, which maximizes the industry surplus.
Thereby, a retailer's incentive to deviate to an alternative supplier in order to free-ride on the contract of its rival retailer remains an issue. However, the existence of upstream …xed costs reduces each retailer's incentive to deviate since the deviating retailer has to bear the entire …xed costs of the alternative supplier. As a consequence, monopolization of the downstream industry can be an equilibrium for su¢ ciently high …xed costs. Our results do not depend on the nature of downstream competition. In contrast to Sha¤er (1991) , where the anticompetitive e¤ect of two-part tari¤s relies on Bertrand competition among di¤erentiated retailers, our insights also hold under Cournot competition in the downstream market, where the output decisions are strategic substitutes.
There is a wide literature on how vertical contracting a¤ects market outcomes. 8 In a recent 7 In vertical structures with either an upstream monopoly and a downstream oligopoly or an upstream oligopoly and a downstream monopoly, the vertically related …rms do not internalize the impact of their individual decisions on the overall industry pro…t when supply is based on linear contracts. This problem of double marginalization results in too high consumer prices which do not maxmize overall industry pro…t. As is well-known, it can be overcome by two-part tari¤ contracts. ) show that monopolization of the industry is an equilibrium when the retailers' o¤ers can be contingent on the relationship being exclusive or not. Studying a model where a dominant supplier distributes its product through retailers that also sell substitute products from a competitive fringe, Inderst and Sha¤er (2010) …nd as well that the industry pro…t can be maximized when the contracts used are market-share contracts, i.e., 4 paper, Rey and Whinston (2013) , study a model of vertical contracting between a manufacturer and two retailers. They show that when retailers can o¤er a menu of three-part tari¤s, there is always an equilibrium in which no exclusion occurs and industry pro…ts are maximized. In contrast, we pursue a di¤erent approach. We do not examine the monopolizing e¤ects resulting from di¤erent contracting arrangements, but we explain industry monopolization by exogenous …xed costs. We also contribute to the small literature that deals with food safety standards in food supply chains. This literature deals mainly with the question of how those private standards are chosen. 9 We, instead, take the existence as well as the adoption of either public or private standards as given in order to consider the implications in vertically related markets of the associated compliance costs for the contracting and, …nally, consumer prices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our theoretical framework and characterize the monopoly outcome to provide an appropriate benchmark.
Section 3 contains the equilibrium analysis if linear contracts are used. In Section 4, we study the case of non-linear contracts. In Section 5, we illustrate our results using a linear example.
Finally, we discuss our results and conclude (sections 5 and 6).
The Model
Consider a perfectly competitive upstream industry, which produces a homogeneous good, and two di¤erentiated retailers i = 1; 2; which sell to …nal consumers. 10 The upstream …rms produce at constant marginal cost, c 0. In addition, each upstream manufacturer bears a …xed cost K 0 if production actually takes place. 11 The …xed cost K is neither scale-dependant nor a retailer receives discounts according to its total purchases. We further assume that the upstream …rms have prohibitively high costs to sell directly to consumers.
We consider a three-stage game. First, the manufacturers make simultaneous contract o¤ers to the retailers, where they are allowed to discriminate between the retailers. Second, the retailers observe all contract o¤ers and decide from which manufacturer they will exclusively buy. Finally, the retailers compete noncooperatively in prices. The game is solved by backward induction where our equilibrium concept refers to subgame perfection.
We consider two di¤erent types of vertical contracts: i) a contract only consisting of a linear wholesale price w i and ii) a two-part tari¤ contract (w i ; F i ), entailing a linear wholesale price w i and a …xed fee F i . The …xed payment can be positive, zero or negative, whereas a negative …xed fee indicates a slotting fee paid by the manufacturer to the retailer. We do not allow for contracts that are contingent on the rival retailer-supplier pair's contract. Furthermore, we assume that each retailer-supplier pair may agree on an exclusivity clause in order to avoid a retailer accepting the payment of slotting allowances without stocking the manufacturer's product.
Each retailer i faces a demand function D i (P ); where P = (P 1 ; P 2 ) indicates the vector of retail prices. Demand is twice di¤erentiable and downward-sloping with
denote the retailer i's ‡ow pro…t when it sells at a price P i and the rival retailer j 6 = i sells at P j : The retailer i's total pro…t is given by i (P ) = R i (P )
The following assumptions ensure a well-behaved price competition problem which brings about a unique Nash equilibrium (see Sha¤er 1991) 
for pro…t maximization; ii) @ 2
guarantees both uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and also ensures that each retailer i's equilibrium marginal return decreases in its marginal cost w i .
We now characterize the equilibrium retail prices. In the last stage of the game, both retailers set their prices so as to maximize their pro…ts. The corresponding …rst-order conditions are given by:
6 whose solution yields the equilibrium prices P (w 1 ; w 2 ) = (P 1 (w 1 ; w 2 ) ; P 2 (w 1 ; w 2 )): For ease of exposition, we use the simpli…ed notation P i := P i (w 1 ; w 2 ) and P := P (w 1 ; w 2 ). Comparative statics reveal that an increase of the retailer i's wholesale price w i results in an increase of both retail prices:
and,
Using the equilibrium retail prices P (w 1 ; w 2 ), we derive the wholesale prices that maximize the industry pro…t. The reduced form of the overall gross industry pro…t is given by:
Maximizing (4) with respect to w i , we obtain:
which simpli…es to:
Solving the respective equation system for w 1 and w 2 , we get the equilibrium wholesale
, which maximize the overall industry pro…t. The optimal wholesale prices are such that the …nal product prices P (w 1 ; w 2 ) are raised to the level a fully integrated monopolist would choose. 12 In the following, the equilibrium wholesale prices w M will be used as a benchmark.
1 2 A monopolist sets the prices P1 and P2 as to maximize P i (Pi c)Di(P ); which leads to the …rst-order conditions (Pi c)@P i Di(P ) + Di(P ) + (Pj c)@P i Dj(P ) = 0 for i; j = 1; 2 and j 6 = i. Inspecting the expressions in the rectangular brackets on the right-hand side of (5), we …nd that the optimal wholesale prices w M also ful…ll the …rst-order conditions of an integrated monopolist.
Linear Contracts
We start with the analysis of linear contracts. In the second stage of the game, retailers observe all contract o¤ers and select the most pro…table o¤ers. At the same time, manufacturers will not o¤er contracts that earn them negative pro…ts. As suppliers incur …xed costs K and perfectly compete for exclusively supplying the retailers, the latter will decide to purchase from a common supplier in equilibrium. The common supplier sets wholesale prices to solve the following maximization problem:
As retail pro…ts decrease in wholesale prices, the constraint of the common supplier to earn non-negative pro…ts is binding. Using symmetric retailers, the symmetric equilibrium wholesale prices are, thus, implicitly given by: 13
The equilibrium wholesale price is equal to the marginal cost of production plus a margin which increases linearly with the level of the …xed cost K. The margin corresponds to the …xed cost K devided by the total sales. An increase of the …xed cost K leads to raising wholesale prices for ful…lling the manufacturer's zero-pro…t condition. In the absence of any …xed costs, the wholesale prices are set equal to marginal cost (see Proposition 1 in: Sha¤er 1991).
There exists an upper bound of the …xed cost, K, which can be a¤orded by the upstream manufacturer. Using symmetry, the maximum value corresponds to the maximized pro…t of a single supplier which serves both retailers; i.e., K := P 2 i=1 (w max c)D i (P (w max ; w max )) with:
It is obvious that w L can never exceed w max and, thus, there exists no equilibrium when K > K.
Proposition 1 In the case of linear contracts, both retailers can receive the same equilibrium wholesale price w L which is given by (7). w L is monotonically increasing in K in the interval
, with w L = 0 at K = 0 and w L = w max at K = K. Moreover, there exists a 1 3 As other couples of wholesale prices ful…ll the manufacturer's zero-pro…t condition, there also exists asymmetric equilibria with w
Proof. To prove the last part of Proposition 1, we evaluate (6) for w i = w max i , which gives the requirement:
we get:
Using (2) and (3) and rearranging terms, we can re-write the last equation as:
Applying symmetry, we obtain:
If the equilibrium wholesale price equals w M , the industry pro…t is maximized. As rents can only be transferred via the linear wholesale price, parts of the overall industry pro…t cannot be shifted to the supplier. This implies that the maximum …xed costs the supplier can cover are necessarily lower than the monopoly industry outcome, i.e., K < w M 1 ; w M 2 : Our results
) the equilibrium wholesale price exceeds the wholesale price that ensures the monopoly outcome, i.e., w L > w M .
4 Non-linear Contracts
We now assume that the upstream manufacturers o¤er non-linear contracts in the form of twopart tari¤ contracts (w i ; F i ) to the retailers. Each retailer purchases from the supplier it earns the highest pro…t with. In equilibrium, both retailers buy from the same supplier due to the existence of upstream …xed costs. The manufacturers o¤er contracts (w i ; F i ) to both retailers which maximize the industry surplus subject to earning non-negative pro…t. Equilibrium contracts have to be immune against bilateral deviation of one of the retailers with an alternative supplier.
We show the existence of an equilibrium, where the common supplier proposes a wholesale price w M i which maximizes the industry pro…t, and uses the …xed fee to redistribute the joint surplus to the respective retailer. Suppose that the corresponding …xed fee is given by:
where i 2 [0; 1] (with i + j = 1; 8i = 1; 2; j 6 = i) indicates how the industry pro…t is shared among the retailers. Such a two-part tari¤ (w M i ; F M i ) constitutes an equilibrium contract if an alternative supplier cannot propose a better o¤er to any retailer j 6 = i leading to a unilateral deviation by that retailer. We denote by
the joint pro…t of a retailer j 6 = i and an alternative supplier without considering the …xed costs, where w BR j (w M i ) denotes the best-response to the wholesale price w M i , i.e.:
is an equilibrium contract if:
which simpli…es to the condition:
A larger value of K makes a unilateral deviation less attractive as the deviating retailer must cover the entire …xed costs of the alternative supplier.
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The monopoly industry outcome is, therefore, more likely to be an equilibrium the higher the …xed costs of the upstream industry. In detail, for any
; there exists a symmetric equilibrium, where both retailers earn an equal share of the overall industry pro…t, i.e. w M 1 ; w M 2 K =2 and, thus, the monopoly outcome in the downstream market can always be sustained. 14 This equilibrium is unique for K = e K. 15 We get multiplicity of equilibria for K > e K; and the range of feasible sharing rules in equilibrium is
; all sharing possibilities among retailers, i.e. i 2 [0; 1] ; constitute an equilibrium. This implies that it is even possible that one retailer gets the full industry pro…t, while its upstream competitor ends up with zero pro…t.
Under two-part tari¤ contracts, the vertically related …rms can make use of two instruments.
For K e K, the supplier charges a wholesale price w M that ensures the monopoly industry outcome. The …xed fee is used to transfer rents to the downstream …rms up to the level where the supplier's pro…t cover the …xed costs. For e K K < b K, the …xed fees are negative as the upstream ‡ow pro…t exceeds K; i.e.
the supplier's ‡ow pro…t does not cover the …xed cost. To ensure the supplier's participation constraint, the retailers have to pay …xed fees in order to shift at least part of their rents to the supplier in order to ensure its zero-pro…t constraint.
For relatively low values of the …xed cost, i.e., K < e K, the monopoly industry outcome under two-part tari¤s is not an equilibrium. As the incentive constraint given in (8) is binding, the equilibrium wholesale prices w T 1 (K) = w T 2 (K) = w T (K) are, thus, implicitly given in case of symmetric retailers by the highest wholesale prices satisfying:
Note that this symmetric equilibrium implying an equal distribution of the industry pro…t among the retailers is unique for all K < e K: An asymmetric equilibrium is not possible because an 1 4 Schutz (2012) questions the existence of an equilibrium in Sha¤er (1991) for the case of non-linear contracts.
To the contrary, the equilibrium we highlight for K e K is immune to multilateral deviations as considered by Schutz. This is due to the fact that the equilibrium contract implies the monopolization of the industry for
unequal distribution of pro…ts among retailers would lead to stronger deviation incentives of the low-pro…t retailer resulting in lower wholesale prices and, thus, a lower overall industry pro…t. 16 The equilibrium contracts are, thus, given by w
The existence of such an equilibrium requires that the realized industry pro…ts, w T 1 (K); w T 2 (K) , are larger than K. Note further that the wholesale price w T i (K) is monotonically increasing in K as:
holds everywhere. The equilibrium gross industry surplus is, thus, increasing in K.
Obviously, slotting allowances emerge in equilibrium when the wholesale prices lead to upstream ‡ow pro…ts exceeding K. Then, the common supplier has to transfer rents to the retailers by lump-sum payments inducing a negative …xed fee. This allows wholesale prices to be higher under two-part tari¤ contracts than under linear contracts. Under linear tari¤s, the upstream …rm charges the lowest possible wholesale price to its buyers as there is no second instrument to transfer rents between the vertically related …rms. This …nding contradicts the general presumption that non-linear contracts are more e¢ cient than linear contracts in vertical relations.
However, if slotting allowances are banned, the common supplier cannot transfer rents to the retailers by lump-sum payments. In this case, if the ban is binding, the wholesale prices are the same under both contracting regimes. If the ban is not binding, wholesale prices under two-part tari¤s undercut the wholesale prices under linear tari¤s as the upstream gross pro…t plus the …xed fees are used to cover the …xed cost. Our results can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 2 Industry monopolization arises as an equilibrium outcome whenever K e K.
For K = e K, there exists a unique equilibrium; while for K > e K; there exist multiple equilibria with alternative sharing rules. For lower values of K, i.e., K < e K, industry monopolization is not an equilibrium outcome. The equilibrium wholesale price w T (K) satis…es:
to avoid unilateral deviation. Existence of such an equilibrium requires K w T (K); w T (K) .
1 6 We can de…ne other potential equilibria based on di¤erent sharing rules of the industry pro…ts where nondeviation of retailers is ensured. However, these potential equilibria are strictly pareto-dominated by the presented equilibrium, in which the …xed costs are equally shared between retailers.
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5 Example: Linear demand
To illustrate our results, we apply linear demand functions and set the supplier's marginal cost of production to zero, i.e., c = 0. Consistent with our assumptions, the inverse demand functions P i (q 1 ; q 2 ) are given by:
where 2 (0; 1) indicates how substitutable the retailers are from a consumer perspective.
The higher the higher the degree of substitutability. Solving the system of inverse demand functions (see (10)), we get the following demand functions:
The retailers set their prices so as to maximize their pro…ts, which yields:
In the following, we derive the wholesale prices under the two di¤erent contracting regimes.
Note as a benchmark that the monopoly industry outcome is sustained for w M = =2 implying a monopoly industry pro…t of:
Linear contracts. Note …rst that the equilibrium wholesale price equals marginal cost if the …xed cost equals zero, i.e., w L = 0 for K = 0. Using our assumptions and applying condition (7), the equilibrium wholesale price for linear contracts is given by:
That is, the common supplier that delivers to the two retailers always makes zero pro…t. Correspondingly, the wholesale price w L exceeds the wholesale price w M that ensures the monopoly outcome for:
Note that the maximum cost that can be a¤orded is given by:
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That is, in the interval K 2 (K; M ], the supplier's ‡ow pro…t never covers the …xed cost, so that trade can never occur. Because of the double marginalization problem, a …xed cost larger than K can never be covered. Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium outcomes under linear contracts depending on the value of K and the product di¤erentiation parameter . In the interval [0; K], a trade-equilibrium exists: while in the interval [ b K; K], the …xed cost is so high that the equilibrium wholesale price exceeds the industry maximizing wholesale price, for K < b K; however, the wholesale price is below the industry maximizing level. Let us de…ne the wholesale price of the deviating supplier-retailer pair as:
The solution to this maximization problem is given by:
The corresponding retailer pro…t is given by:
Thus, we get monopolization of the industry pro…t if:
The more substitutable the products are, the more pro…table is the deviation strategy; thus, to prevent unilateral deviation K has to be su¢ ciently large. In other words, e K is increasing in (see Figure 3) . Note that for K > b K; the retailers have to pay a transfer to the supplier to ful…ll its participation constraint.
If the monopoly industry outcome cannot be sustained because of unilateral deviation, i.e.
K < e K; the equilibrium wholesale prices are implicitly given by:
which implies the following equilibrium wholesale prices:
We get slotting allowances if:
This is an equilibrium as long as the respective industry pro…t exceeds K, which holds for all Based on our results, we assess the impact of the …xed costs on retail prices (see Figure   4 ). We …nd that the implications of K are less severe the more di¤erentiated the products are whenever downstream monopolization is feasible. Otherwise, we obtain similar results as under linear contracts. 
Discussion
Our results are derived under various assumptions, which we discuss in the following.
Public vs. Secret Contracts. The previous analysis relies critically on the ability of a given retailer to observe the details of its rival retailer's contract. Otherwise, suppliers had an incentive to behave opportunistically to the detriment of downstream retailers. Under secret contracts, wholesale prices, therefore, equal marginal cost of production and …xed fees are used to cover the …xed cost. The existence of an equilibrium is only guaranteed for K < (c; c). It follows that …xed costs have no impact on retail prices with secret two-part tari¤s. In the linear tari¤s'case, the analysis is unchanged because opportunistic behavior of the common upstream …rm is not an issue.
Cournot Competition. So far, we have assumed that the downstream …rms compete in prices. Thereby, the best response to an increasing price of the rival is to charge a higher price in equilibrium, i.e., prices are strategic complements. 18 Consider the same industry structure as above and a simple linear demand for perfect substitutes with P (Q) = 1 Q, where Q = q 1 + q 2 indicates the sum of quantities o¤ered in the downstream market. As previously, we assume c = 0. Both retailers maximize their pro…ts by setting a quantity q i = (1 2w i + w j )=3, for i = 1; 2, j 6 = i. The equilibrium wholesale prices under linear contracts are given by
We get that w L (K) is larger than the monopoly wholesale price which is w M = 1=4 for K > b K := 1=8. The existence of equilibria is guaranteed for K < K := 2=9.
In the case of two-part tari¤ contracts, we get monopolization of the industry pro…t for
Furthermore, the comparison of wholesale prices shows that the selected supplier pays slotting allowances for all K < b K := 1=8. 
Conclusion
The literature on vertical contracting suggests that upstream …xed costs do not a¤ect the market outcome. This is true for the case of an upstream monopolist that contracts with two competing (di¤erentiated) downstream …rms under complete information. The supplier can specify two-part tari¤s with …xed fees that are set so as to extract all the downstream surplus, while wholesale prices are used to maximize industry pro…ts. Hence, the contracting outcome is independent of the supplier's …xed costs. A similar reasoning applies to linear tari¤s. As the supplier aims at maximizing its pro…t, upstream …xed costs do not a¤ect the market outcome as long as the upstream pro…ts are large enough to cover the …xed costs. 20 In contrast to the existing literature, this article o¤ers an alternative view. Upstream …xed costs may help to dampen downstream competition and as a result consumer surplus may decrease.
Considering a vertical setting with a perfectly competitive upstream market and assuming that vertical contracting is based on two-part tari¤s, upstream …xed costs may enable competing (di¤erentiated) downstream …rms to monopolize the market. The reason is that upstream …xed costs induce the retailers to buy from a common supplier. This enables each of them to avoid bearing the entire …xed cost, which would be the case when contracting with an alternative supplier. Even if the retailer's incentive to deviate with an alternative supplier in order to freeride on the contract of its competing retailer still remains an issue, we show that a su¢ ciently high …xed cost do not allow for such a deviation. As a consequence, monopolization of the industry is an equilibrium for a high enough …xed cost in two-part tari¤ contracting. For a lower …xed cost, retail prices are still larger than in the absence of …xed costs because contracting with an alternative supplier is always more costly than contracting with the same supplier.
In the case of linear tari¤s, retail prices are also increasing in the upstream …xed cost. The reason is that wholesale prices have to increase in the …xed upstream cost in order to enable the upstream …rm of covering its cost since there are no …xed fees allowing to redistribute rents between the downstream and the upstream …rms. In sum, upstream …xed costs raise retail prices when there is both intra-and interbrand competition.
Our results imply that upstream …xed costs which may result from various regulations such as consumer protection policies, are neither neutral for retail pricing nor less worrisome than other changes in marginal costs. To the contrary, the predicted outcome can be even more detrimental to …nal consumers than changes in marginal costs. In our setting, rising marginal costs lead to higher retail prices without changing the intensity of downstream competition. The existence of upstream …xed costs, instead, may enable the monopolization of the downstream market. Accordingly, the potential bene…ts of various regulations implying …xed upstream costs are less clear than expected from a consumer perspective. Our analysis provides a framework which can be used to test empirically these impacts.
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